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I. Introduction
Hawaii’s Prepaid Health CareAct (“PPHCA”)’ of 1974
was lauded as the “first employer-mandated health
care legislation in the country.’2 Created to improve
health care access for the uninsured, it provides that
all employees in Hawaii who work twenty hours or
more per week have access to health care. Some three
decades later, this Hawaii experiment has produced
unexpected results. The overall insurance coverage
rate is estimated to be the same today as it was prior to
the enactment of the PPHCA.3 More importantly, the
implementation of the PPHCA has instead become the
root cause of a health care monopoly in Hawaii. The
manner in which the Act has been administered via
the Prepaid Health CareAdvisory Council (“Council”)
raises questions concerning antitrust behavior. This
article discusses the underlying reasons for these
concerns. The scope of this article, however, does
not attempt to develop a detailed antitrust analysis. A
brief overview here may be helpful to understanding
the organization of this article.
In 1974, Hawaii enacted what was truly an innova
tive plan the PPHCA — not knowing that Congress
would, within months, preempt the PPHCA by passing
the federal Employees Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”),4 ERISA was designed to assure Ameri
cans that their pension and other retirement benelIts
would be solvent and well managed. As such, ERISA’s
effectiveness depended on universal applicability
which it achieved with a broad preemption clause.
Unfortunately, with this preemption clause, ERISA
immediately precluded Hawaii’s brand-new PPHCA
as well as other states’ initiatives.5 Congress later
amended ERISA, giving Hawaii a unique exemption.
This exemption from ERISA preemption was granted
partly because the PPHCA was a new concept in health
care delivery, essentially a state-wide experiment in
comprehensive employer mandated benefits . Con
gress “allowed Hawaii to experiment with [what was
then I innovative health care legislation.”7 However,
the language of the exemption amendment and the
manner in which the Act has been implemented have
led to the development of a health care monopoly in
Hawaii.
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Two health plans donunate Hawaii’s market, the Hawaii Medi
cal Service Association (“1-IMSA”). a licensee of Blue Cross.’Blue
Shield, and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (“Kaiser”). HMSA
currently claims 72 of the State’s insureds and Kaiser, I 7’.’
Because of its dominant market share, HMS.\ presurnabl exerts
monopoly market power in Hawaii,u
Every health plan intending to do business in the state must first
win approval of the Council, as provided for by the PPHCA,’°
However, employees of HMSA and Kaiser (cc llectively represent
ing 89% of the State’s insureds ( have served comimiously as voting
members of the Council since I )75. 1-IMSA and Kaiser emplo ees
only recentl resigned from the Council in February 2003. This
article will discuss how the Council’s former composition ma hase
facilitated anticompetitive activity. effec tivelo keeping competition
out of the Hawaii market.
Part 11 of this article provides background on the PPHCA, the
Council, ERISA, and the PPHCA’s exemption from ERiSApreemp
tion, Part II also examines Hawaii’s current healthcare market and
the role of the Council in determining that market. Part III raises
issues of potential monopoly behaviorrelating to the PPHCA and the
Council, Part IV discusses possible remedies, then concludes that
active state supervision of the Council is the most h. gical immediate
solution, and linallv suggests that an amendment to the PPHCA or
its actual repeal should be considered as a long—term remedy.
IL Background
A. The PPIIC A.The Council, ERISA And Its Preemption Clause,
And The PPHCAs Exemption
I. The PPHCA
The purpose of the PPHCA was to provide health care coverage to
the greatest number of Hawaii residents*’ Prior to passage of the
PPHCA, a gap groupt4existed which was not covered by any health
insurance. By mandating coverage far employees who worked
t ent hours or more per week, Has au had a great opportunity to
narrow this gap group. However. “according to the best available
aggregate data, the fraction of Hawaiians with hospital benefits in
1969 (8X.3Q “‘ is essentially unchanged three decades later when
compared to the percent of insured. 88.9 -. in I99”.
The PPHCA essentially set a standard for mandated health care
coverage by specifying that a qualified health plan must provide
“benefits equal to, or medically reasonably substitutable for, the
benefits provided by prepaid health plans of the same type
which have the largest numbers of the subscribers in the StateS.”
The Council allows two types of plans to currently prevail, a com
prehensive Type A (modeled after HMSA or Kaiser Health Main
tenance Organization (“HMO”) plans) and the less comprehensive
Type B,t’ The PPHCA mandates the specific benefits which Type
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A & Type B plans must provide.° These include in-patient hospital
care, outpatient hospital care, surgical benefits, medical benefits,
diagnostic services, maternil benefits, substance abuse benefits.
outpatient care, and detoxification.: However,
tl pe B plans usualls incorporate reduced cos crage at looser costs.
such as up-front deductibles or “existing condition clauses. PPHC.\
074 also contains an incentive foremplovers to provide Type A plans:
there is no requirement for emploaer contribution toward dependent
coverage under Type A plans. while employers must pay for at least
50% of dependent premiums if they offer a Type B plan.
Because there is an inherent incentive to avoid fronting half of the
cost of dependents’ insurance, and because there is little difference
in premium cost between T pe Aand Type B plans. most employers
opt for Tpe A plans.
Under the PPI-ICA. the Director of the Department of Labor and
Industrial Relations (“DLIR”) is charged v ith administering and
enforcing the PPHCA.’ The Director also ultimately determines
whether any health plan complies with the mandated standards
established by the PPHCA*3
2. The Council
The Director of the DLIR is mandated to appoint a Council ss hose
members represent medical and public health professions, consumers.
and persons with experience in prepaid health care.’ The Council
may consist of up to seven memhers? Until recently, the members
included a benefit plans consultant, a hospital personnel officer.
a human resources officer from the hotel industry, a physician in
private practice medicine, an insurance agent. an HMSA employee,
and a Kaiser employee. A newspaper investigative report, in 2001,
noted that representatives of “Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, the
largest health maintenance organization in the state, and 1-IMSA,
the largest fee-for-service provider” have been voting members of
the Council.’ At that time. Council members had served terms
ranging from one to sixteen years.
On January 21. 2003. a newly elected Governor Linda Lingle.
in her first State of the State Address. “proposledl that l-IMS.\ and
Kaiser Permanente he prohibited in the fLiture from sitting on the
board that recommends which insurance companies can enter the
market in HMSA and Kaiser both voluntarily resigned
from the Council shortly after the Governor’s Address.3 Following
this, the State of Hawaii Twenty-Second Legislature then passed,
and the Governor signed. SB 665 SDI HD2 CDI which prohibits
“a person representing a health maintenance organization under
chapter 432[). a mutual benefit society issuing individual anti group
hospital or medical service plans tinder chapter 432. or any other
health care organization” from membership on the Council.
At the heginnine of each year. the Council chooses the plans that
will be the benchmarks for the coming year - usually an 1-IMSAplan
and Kaiser HMO.33 New companies applying for approval to sell
insuranìce in the state must provide, at a minimum, similar coverage
at similar cost to the plan enrollee.34 These new companies submit
their applications to the DLIR, at which time departmental staff
review the paperwork along with a checklist and submit them to
the Council for approval. Among the required data are: proposed
premium rates, deductible amounts, stop-loss provisions, detailed
coverage information regarding hospital. surgical. medical. outpa
tient care, maternity, and other benefits.3’ The Council then may
recommend approval of a plan with provisos. The Council may
also reject a plan for any number of reasons.35
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3. ERISA
Congress enacted ERISAto solve anationwide problemof inadequate
and failed employee pension. health, and welfare plans. “ Prior to
ERISA. many Americans. s ho had relied on these plans for retire
ment. found these plans failing for numerous reasons, including
mismanagement and under-funding.4°To sohe this problem, ERISA
required plan administrators to comply with certain regulations and
gave employees specific rights.41 Because the pension plan problem
was nation—wide, Congress chose a global solution and placed almost
all employee pension, health, and welfare plans under the ERISi\
urnbrella. ERISA was signed into law on September 2, 1974.
4. ERIS.Vs preemption clause
ERISr\ preempted’ Hass au’s PPIICA. Its preemption clause
states that “[ERISA I shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may noc or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
This preemption of state law is”express” - specificall pre
empting conflicting state law. ‘ The ERISA preemption clause has
been referred to as “Ipjossibly the farthest-reaching provision in the
statute”49
- the ERISA “statute’s ‘crowning achievement’.”49
ER iSA’s preemption clause significantly constrained many states’
initiatives for health care reform.91 It is remarkable that these far
reaching effects of ERISA were not anticipated.51 The legislative
history of the statute reveals that the preemption clause in both the
original House and Senate versions was narrow in scope and would
have had only a partial preemptis e effect.’ However, those who
had a vested interest in health care reform were not involved in the
discussions that led to ERISA’s enactment.’ “[TIhe Department of
Labor, which would administerERiSA, was apparently notconsulted
about the changes in the preemption clause. The Senate conferees
were . . . responsible for health policy, hut idid not discussi the
implications of preemption with their counterparts on the health
subcommittee.”54 Special interest groups pushing the preemption
clause were successful in having it introduced in the final days
of conference committee deliberations.55 Thus, the tremendous
significance of the broad preemption clause passed unnoticed and
unappreciated for its breadth.
Also remarkable about the preemption clause is that it prohibits
the states fmm making any law regarding employee benefit plans
even where federal law is silent. the so—called “regulatory vacuum.”’
It inhibits the states with regard to health insurance even though
federal law does not regulate substantive benefits.57
The State of Hawaii created its PPHCA prior to ERISA. not
anticipating any federal health care legislation,59 With the passage
of ERISA three months later in September 1974, Hawaii’s new
PPHCA became “obviously vulnerable” to preemption.
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5. The PPHCA’s exemption from ERISA
Although the federal enactment of ERISA in 1974 was immediatel
applicable to Hawaii, the state’s challenge to ERISA preemption
did not actuatE start until 97(i.” This challenge became a long
campaign to save the I lawau PPHCA that did not end until I 983
when Congressfinallv grantedan e\emption ItremainsCongress’s
onE exemption forstatew ide emplo ermandatedhealth care.”’ This
challenge began with a 1976 amendment to the PPHCA.’
In 1976.1—law au amended the PPHCAto include the diagnosis and
treatment of substance abuse as a mandated henetit.” “Emplo\ ers
ho fail]edj to compl with the rergurements of the Raw au Act
P11 IC’.-\ I [w crc] enjoined from can ing on their businesses in an
place in the State, and [were] I able to tines and other remedie,’”
Standard Oil Company, which did not cover certain mandated ben
etits and which had not complied with mandated reporting,’ tiled
suit in federal court seeking an injunction,65 arguing that ERISA
had preempted the PPI-ICA.69 Both the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that ERISA did preempt the PPHcA.7° The U.S.
Supreme Court later affirmed the lower courts’ rulings.7
However, while the Standard Oil litigation was proceeding.
supporters of the PPHCA continued to promote the Act both lo
cal lv and nationally despite the uncertainty of whether or not it
was preempted by ERlSA. On a local level. Hawaii contintied to
comply with the PPHCA and, in time, it “became part of the work
culture of Hawaii.”’ On a national level, the Hawaii Congressional
delegation continued in its efforts to obtain either a Congressional
amendment or exemption to ER ISA preemption’
After the State lost its case in federal district court in 1977. the
Hawaii senators introduced legislation to Congress, attempting to
exempt the PPHCA from ERISA preen’iptioil.’ Thex’ lobbied while
the State’s appeal in the Ninth Circuit was proceeding.’6The sena
tors. however, encountered either ambivalence or opposition from
numerous fronts including ke senators. theAFL-CIO. the Business
Roundtahle. the ERISA lndustr Committee. life and health insur
ance associations, the American Council on life Insurance, and
the Carter Administration and Undersecretary of I ,ahor. Robert J.
Brown.’
It has been suggested that”]t]he first Senate hearmgson the exemp
tion of I Iawaii were also the tirst public occasion on which the histor
ofERlSApreemption was rewritten.”’’ Though evidence exists that
C’ongress enacted ERISA “w ithout specitic discussion.” the new
claim was that “Congress. it seemed, had inadvertently preempted
state—mandated health benefits.”” Whether this was influential in
persuading Congress to reconsider the PPHCA’s preemption is not
clear.
With persistence. the I lavaii delegation finally succeeded in its
efforts and Congress voted to exempt the PPHCA from the ERISA
preemption clause in 1983.” But this was not without a cost. Con
gress granted the exemption but expressly mandated that the PPHCA
should stand as it was written in 1974, some nine years earlier, without
the 1976 increase in mandated benefits to which Standard Oil had
earlier objected.” Expressly preempted was “any amendment of
the Prepaid Health Care Act enacted after September 2, 1974. in the
e.vte,,t it pro vtdes Jor more tluiii the el/relive administration otsmIe
(1.6 in eI/’ct on 1((’Ii dote.”’ Thus. Congress made exceedingl\
clear its reluctance to consider anx future exemptions for Hawaii.
Congress also explicitly stated that “the amendment made b this
section shall not be considered a precedent with respect to extend
ing such amendment to an\ other State law.’” Again. Congress’s
intent was clear
— it had agreed to grandfather the Hawaii PPHCA.
but it was unwilling to extend an further exemptions to am of the
other states.’5
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B. The Current Health Care Market Dr. Meyers stated that
As noted earlier, 1-IMSA and Kaiserdominate the market. HMSA.
a non-protit tax-exempt mutual henelit societ . wields monopol
pos er as a seller of health insurance, and monopsonv power as
a purchaser of the services of health care providers.”” In I 977.
1-IMSA provided coverage for 44.3 o people in the private sector
and served as the third party administrator for Medicare and seyeral
other health plans.’9 Kaiser, HMSA’s closest competitor, provided
coverage br only I 4.7% of the private sector:’ In 1999, more than
60% Of consumers were covered h\ HMSA: and estimates for
2000. are closer to 72%. As these tigures indicate. “HMSA has
enormous capacity to exercise control. “‘ Lndouhtedlx. HMSA is a
dominant market player and has enormous marketing power which
makes Hawaii. for all practical purposes. “a single payor health
insurance system”94 and a monopoly health care market.
According to Professor Richard S. Miller, Professor of Law,
Emeritus, William S. Richardson School of Law,95 HMSA”virtually
monopolizes the Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and is
almost the only buyer of physicians’ PPO services in this State *
.“ Indeed, the participating provider agreement, which physicians
must sign in order to contract with FIMSA, was characterized as a
contract of adhesion in 1999, by Arleen Meyers. M.D., J.D .,founder
and President of the Hawaii Coalition for Health (“Coalition”), a
non—profit health care consumer advocacy organization,97
In 1999, the Coalition tiled a complaint with Hawaii’s Insurance
Commissioner against HMSA. The following discussion of the
Coalition’s complaint is not offered in this article as legal authority.
hut to describe an aspect of the current health care market that has
recently raised some antitrust concern. The Coalition’s complaint
alleged “unfair contracting practices and creating a business envi
ronment of adhesion, coercion, and intimidation and for exercising
its monopsony power to unreasonably restrain physicians’ ability
to provide quality care for their patients orto advocate on behalf of
their patients ....“‘ As regards HMSA and its provider contract.
FIMS.-\ occupies more than sist\ percent (60%) of the consumer
market for health insurance and is the major pavor of reimburse—
rnents for medical care for virtuall’, all II awai i ph’ sicians svl ate
not tull emploed by a single health maintenance organization. It
ph sicians practicinc outside the Kaiser Pcrmanente sstem don’t sell
their services to RN-ISA. the are forced to go Out of business. As a
result, physicians are under enormous economic press ure to enter into
any contract proffered h HNIS-\ res.ardlcss of whether the terms are
anti—competitis e oragainst their or their patients’ individual self—inter
est. fitfN.-i. theretore holds built nuniopol- and monopsonv pole?’ o/
dan i1’r( nO pmpor000s precludi rig an single phs sician ‘s ahi I it\ to
negotiate with HMSA for either herself or her patients
In response, HMSAargued that health care contracts between I IMSA
and its providers were pris ate contracts and not under the regulation
of the Insurance Commissioner.
The Coalition’s complaint was settled in 2000.101 HMSA agreed
to “significant changes in the appeals processes it provides to phy
sicians, while the Commissioner accepted HMSA’s assertion that
federal law prohibits state regulation of contracts between insurers
and providers.”tm2
III. Antitrust Issues
This section will discuss potential antitrust issues and monopoly
behavior, however, it mList again he noted that the scope of this ar
ticle does not permit a detailed antitrust analysis. The discussion in
this section deals with the Council’s implementation of the PPHCA
and the Act’s regulatory limitations.
Of note. HMSA and Kaiser representatives were first appointed to
the Council in 1975, when the PPHCA was initially implemented.
and served continuously on the Council until February 25. 2003.
when they voluntarily resigned. FIMSA’s membership on the
Council for the past three decades created an extraordinary conflict
of interest and facilitated potential anticompetitive activity on the
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part of 1-IMSA. New companies applying to do business in the state
were oblicated to submit applications and divulge proprietary and
confidential information to the Council.’” While most new plans
would have guarded this information from prospective competitors.
the information instead went directly to HMSA and Kaiseremplovees
by virtue of their membership on the Council.°5 On occasion, this
information also went to more than one 1-IMSA or Kaiser employee
in attendance at meetings of the Council.° Data summary sheets,
usually generated at each Council meeting, assisted a comparison
of benefits between plans. ‘‘ Even a member of the Council itsclf
“acknowledge[dI that by being on the council the two companies
IHMSAand Kaiser ma\ begetting ‘aleg up’ontheircompetitorsbv
seeing their plans ‘ It is likely that this loss of confidentiality
as a strong deterrent to new market entrants possibly serving to
maintain Hawaii’s contracted health care market.
Remarkably, previous directors of the DLIR and previous Council
chairs allowed and even required the sharing of this proprietary
information among market competitors. 1-IMSA and Kaiser may
have had an unfair advantage if their employees who were Council
members directly relayed proprietary information belonging to new
health plan applicants. There was certainly potential for violating
a basic goal of antitnist law - fairness and elimination of unfair
business practicesY
The primary statute that is the basis for federal antitrust law is the
Sherman Acti Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares that activ
ity in restraint of trade is illegal and those who participate in such
activity will be found guilty of a felons punishable by fine and/or
imprisonment or may he subject to damage claims. Section 2
relates to independent conduct and states that “[dyer person who
shall monopoli;e.orattempt to monopolize. orcombineorconspire ‘ ith
any other person or persons. to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony” punishable by fine and/or imprisonment,
or may be subject to damage claims,02
Areeda defines monopoly power “as the power to control price or
to exclude competition. It can be understood as a significant degree
of market er’’’ Market power. in turn, is “the capacit\ to act
other than as woLild a perfectl\ competitive firm. In particular,
most discussions of market power will concern the extent to which
a firm’s most profitable price exceeds competitive price levels.”4
However, market power may also “he inferred from structure, con
duct, performance, or some combination of the three.”5 Areeda
notes that “Idlebate over §2 often contrasts power with conduct,
structure with behavior,”’6
In United ,Staic.c c. Aluminum Co. o/.-lnu’rica (“ALCOA” , AL
COA was alleged to have monopolized the interstate commerce of
aluminum. The case came before Judge Learned Hand of the Lnited
States Circuit Court of Appeals. Second Circuit, via a certificate of
the Supreme Court.- The court held that a monopoly itself is not
evidence of monopolizing and that ALCOA”ma not have achieved
monopoly: monopol\ may have been thrust upon it. ‘‘ a The court
then drew a distinction between “power and conduct. structure and
behavior”’” by stating “that size does not determine guilt; that
there must be some5exclusion’ of competitors: that the growth
must be something else than5nutura/ ‘ or normal’; that there must
be a ‘wrongful intent,’ or some other specific intent; or that some
‘unduly’ coercive means must be used”2’in order to constitute an
antitrust offense.
Similarly, in United States v. Grinnell Corp..’ the defendant had
high market powerconsistin of”over X7i of the business. “‘h “The
percentage is so high as tojustil the finding of monopoi\ And. as
the facts already related indicate, this monopoly was achieved in
large partbv Isiel unlawful and exclusionary practices.”04 Justice
Douglas stated that “jt Ihe offense of monopoly ... has two elements:
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance oJthatpower as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen. or historical accident “b
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EMSA, covering 72% of insureds in a market analysis. would
likely be found to have monopoly power. but monopoly power it
self does not violate antitrust la\\ if it has been legally obtained.’
However, if the l]MS.-\ and Kaiser employees who served on the
Council voted to reject competitor plans for reasons other than lur—
thering the lawfu purposes of the Council. or if II \I SA and Kaiser
benelited from know ledge ofpropnetarv information gained through
the Council. then this conduct could constitute behavior consistent
ss ith illegal maintenance of a monopoly.
Accordmg to an investigative report of a major local newspaper
published in 2001, the previous Council rejected ninety-six out of
an approximate one hundred mainland plans that applied to do husi
necs in Hawaii. l-ifty-nine out of sixty-four plans were rejected
in the tirst seven or eight months of 2001 In the same article.
Professor Thomas Saving. Professor of Economics, Texas A & \1
l niuersitv* stated. I don Vt think there is much doubt that they
I l\lSr\ and the council are deterring entr\ into the market. It
is essential that recent Council denials he scrutini,ed and an as
sessment made of procedures to safeguard the con1identialit and
dtsclosure of proprietary information.
Although it is imperative that the State of l-lawaii provide adequate
supervision ofthe Council, as ProfessorRichard S. Millerrecognized,
there was ‘oniy the most minimal of scrutiny and supervision”
h the state’s DLIR. 13v permitting I IMSA and Kaiser seats on the
Council. previous DLI R directors created a convenient mechanism
tur market competitors to control ness entry into the Hawaii market
and thus may has e facilitated potential monopol antitrust aetis —
it’.. Furthermore. other individuals ss ho s’ crc present at Council
meetings. including 1—INISA and Kaiser emplo ees ss ho svere not
members of the C’ouncil, had the opportunitY to use proprietarY
information discussed at these meetings. New applicants may have
been deterred from even applying to do business in the state when
they realized that they were required to share their information with
major market competitors. and without any guarantee that a license
to sell insurance would even be granted. The bottom line is that
HMSA and Kaiser emplo cc’. should not have served as Council
members because of their inherent conflicts and the appearance of
impropriet\. Informational tires’. aIls should be enacted immediately
ifthev do not vet exist. The newly constituted Council in 2003 must
consider potential conflicts of interest at the same time it reconciles
itself ss ith Hawaii’s sunshine laws.
In response to criticism that the State has not provided adequate
oversight, the previous Administration and [-IMSA may both raise
an argument of state action immunity. 02 However, in order to
claim the protection that state action immunity carries, there must
be. on the of the State. adequate supervision and al clearly
articulated purpose to displace competition’ 0 which appear to be
lacking here. Instead. hei’e. there appears to have been a general
abdication ol the State Linder successive pro’. ions administrations
to provdc iversieht.
There ma also have been an unusuall close working relationship
between the DLIR and H.\ISA, raising a question of propriety. A
previous DLIR director resigned her position as DLIR director in
October. 2000,05 was elected Chair of the Hawaii Democratic Party
in April, 2001, and was then elected to the Board of Directors of
1-IMSA in May. 2001 VOS Scrutiny must he applied to the C’ouncil’s
activities. tt \ nine members, and the State’s supervisor\ role via
the DLIR to insure that all business is conducted with the ackitowl—
edernent of conflicts of interest and with the assurance of propriety
and fair dealing.
The potential monopol problem is farther compounded b a
general requirement of the PPI-1CA which specifies that any plan
operating in the state shall provide “health care benefits equal to,
or medically reasonably substitutable for, the benefits provided by
pp ( /
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prepaid health plans of the same t pe ... which have the largest
numbers of subscribers in the State. Because HMSA is the
plan with the largest number of insureds. any new market player
is mandated to provide the same package of benefits that I IMSA
pros ides. Howe er, in order to compete successfull \Vith I IMSA.
the new plan must provide these benefits at similar or lower cost
or must offer some other value added benefit. Since HMSA has
monopoly tdorninarit market share for selling its plans) and mon—
opsofls (monopol hu in_I poss i it is hihlx unlikL l th it in\
new player can compete succcssfull\ with HMSA.
An ‘. alue added benefit or inno\ ation that a new applicant might
have hoped to use tocompete with HMS.\ ss ould have been divulged
to the pre mis Council. and from there. potentially directly to
HMSA and Kaiser. Esen with HMSA and Kaiser no longer seated
as Council members, theirpresence in the public audienceat (‘ouncil
meetings may continue to serve as a deteiTent to new applicants.
The Council wields significant power. Even if a new applicant
offers a promising, new, and strikingly innovative plan (forexample,
medical savings accounts ormedical IRAs). the Council can still reject
it. and opt to maintain the status quo. In the past, the rationale used
to justify denial of medical savings account plans was that, although
the new plans would provide comprehensive coverage with similar
employee out-of-pocket expenses. the coverage would not be the
same as the Council’s benchmark plans (HMSA and Kaiser)J’
In the past few years. several hcalthplanshaveclosedtheirdoors.1
unable to sustain business in Hass au ‘s market. These plans were un
able to successfully compete ith HMSA. In some cases, the plans
set lov premium rates in order to compete. however these premium
levels were probably too low to cover the costs of doing business.
Few start—ups have assets, reserves, or investment income that are
sufficient enough to offset initial operating losses.’44 Additionally.
few plans can compete in Hawaii because of the generally higher
costs associated with mandated benefits. ‘°
It is vitally important to understand that, despite operating losses
of its health plans, HMSA has, until recently, been able to reporl
yearly net gains because its losses have been offset by relatively huge
returns on investments. HMSA had $37 million in operating losses
in 1998, $18 million in 1999, and $49 million in 2000.’ However.
these losses were offset by investment income of $54 million in
1998, $57 million in 1999. and S66 million in 2000.’ Thus. HMSA
has had tremendous financial ability to offset operating losses with
investment income. This record shows that HMSA likely offered
premiums below the cost of doing business, and health plans that
did not have the financial depth of H\ISA venl out of business.
However. HMSA is not immune to general economic conditions.
especially as relates to investment income. For 2002. HMSA has
now reported losses ot”534.9 million, compared with a S3.4 million
gain in 2001 .... Those losses sere worsened by a S2l.3 million
one—time charge [for technology upgrades I . Excluding the
one—lime charges, HMSrVs net loss for 2002 was SI 3.6 million.”
During that same period. HMSA reported investment income of
$2.6 million, Now, for the first quarter of 2003. HMSA has alreado
reported a net income of 53.7 million.’47 Fe’s companies have
[-IMSA’s ability to s eather economic downturns.
Thr ugh continuing monopoly power, large assets, and knowledge
of other plans’ proprietar information, HMSA has had the requisite
ability to offer below cost pricing. This has resulted in few competi
tors and little choice for consumers who now face a very contracted
market. The situation is ripe for a Section 2 Sherman Act violation
for illegal maintenance of a monopoly, and immediate intervention
is important to determine whether any such conduct has already
occurred.
In 2000 and 2001, soon after other health plans that were unable
to sustain business left the market. HMSA increased its premiums
8.5% and 9% respectively. In 2002. HMSA announced yet another
rate increase of 5ft for small employer groups and 7% for HMSA
Health Plan Hawaii. its HMO thealth maintenance organization)
plan. In 2003. HMS\ announced it would seek appro al for an
11.5% rate increase for small businesses for its Preferred Provider
Plan and a 7.8% rate increase for its Health Plan Hawaii Plus.
Scrutiny can be applied now, to ascertain whether HMSA became
financially stronger simply through good business management or
whether predatory pricing’4 has occurred.
In slim, there is no substantial competitorto HMSAin Hawaii. The
regulatory limitations of the PPHCA and the previous decisions of
the Council, influenced by HMSA and Kaiser serving as members,
may have played important roles in preserving HMSA’s dominant
position.
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IV. Remedies
A. State Government
The most expeditious remedy to correct an environment so condu
cive to antitrust activity has already occurred under the new state
administration. In her first State of the State address in January.
2003. Governor Linda Lingle expressly made known her desire
for a Council excluding [—IMSA and Kaiser, and HMSA and Kaiser
quickly resigned as members of the Council.’-°° This immediately
conveyed a new sense of fairness to the application and approval
process and portends greater supervision of the Council’s activities,
With these assurances, new competitors can now be encouraged to
enter the Hawaii market, Similarly, the public can be assured that
the Council will deliberate fairly. and the public will benefit from
new comnpetit ion in the health care market.
The bigger question, however.
- does the ERISA preemp
non allow the PPHCA to evolve and address the ne demands of
Hawaii’s current health care market? Several authoritics suggest
“ERiS.’\ no severely limits Hawaii’s ability to improve its health
care system, since Hawaii cannot amend its 1974 legislation to
implement more comprehensive and effective reforms.” The
PPHCA is frozen in time, permanently set in a 1974 mindset with
little possibility of amendment. “jTjhe Congressional action that
saved the Hawaii Act from preemption also effectively removed
the ability of the Hawaii legislature to modify it.”°3 The PPHCA
is virtually impossible to change as expressly stated in the preemp
tion waiver.’54 Thus, the Hawaii State Legislature is significantly
precluded from addressing current health care needs.’5
This bar to innovation prevents creative responses to Hawaii’s
changing health care demographics. This is a significant problem.
The l-lawai i Health Information Corporation. reporting health related
data since 1994, cites sc\eral areas of concern. These include a
rapidl increasing elderl\ population. exponentiall growing costs
of chronic care, the shifting of health care coverage to managed
care plans. and a higher rate of inflation for medical care. Costs
for chronic care alone are expected to double over the next two
decades and, in the ear 2020. are expected to account for $tY of
total direct expenditures.
Entities with vested interests in access to health care are aware
of these evolving needs and the inadequac\ of Hawaii’s current
system to address them. Even a Council member recently said,
[t]he market has so changed over the years that the Prepaid Health
Care Act is antiquated beyond its usefulness,”° Despite earlier
attempts of the State to win Congressional approval to change the
PPHCA. those efforts have been consistently rebuffed. ‘
Indeed. “Fi n the I 990s. Congress considered a numherofproposals
for expansive ERISA waivers. Hawaii. among other states, sought
additional waivers that ould allow the state to modify its health
care laws Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its unwilling
ness to extend ERISA waivers for Hawaii.“‘ This is regrettable.
especially in light of evidence that the PPHCA was conceived with
the understanding that it would need to be extended to other patient
groups if it proved to be successful, ‘° The State had realized, at
inception, that gap groups would initially exist, and had provided a
scheme to be implemented later, which would allow the subsequent
inclusion of these gap groups (the self-employed and others).bo
Although the ERISA preemption and exemption clauses preclude
changes to the PPHCA, on close scrutiny, a solution may be found
buried within the language of ERISA itself.
E)espite the general statutory limitation of ERISAs section 514(a).
states caught by ERISA preemption may possibly have two options
to develop their own health care initiatives.’’
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Specifically the Act in
[s]eetion 514(a),, declares that ERISA “supersedes any and all State
lasss insofar as they may now or hereafter relaic to any employee
benefit plan” including ERISA—cosered health plansO. However.
Section 51—h b qualifies this by explicitly pre.o’s’i’inL’ state regutanon
of ‘‘iflSuraavS’, hankine, or securities’’ 2’’e,it’rallv appia ‘able
criminal lass si s of’ a State’’ and 3 the Hawaii Prepald Health Care
Act as amended through September 2. 1974,
States, using a narrow interpretation of section 514(a)’s “relates
to’’ clause, may enact generally applicable legislation that escapes
the “relates to” clause or, alternatively, they ma\ use the “savings
clause” of section 5 l4th that preserves the states’ ability to regulate
insurance,
The “relates to” clause, if narrowly interpreted, may exempt statutes
of’ general applicability, In United Wire, Metal and Machine Health
and Weltn’e Fund v, Morristown Memorial Hospital,16 employee
benefIt plan participants sued to upset New Jersey’s method for de
termining hospital rates, ‘‘ The Third Circuit held that the hospital’s
rate setting scheme was not preempted by ER1SA because it related
to a “statute of general applicabilit.”’” The Supreme Court upheld
this ruling,169
The “savings clause” of ERISA stems from Congress’s original
intent that the states continue to regulate insurance even after
ERISA’s enactment. ‘v” Congress specifically “ saved’ state laws
that regulate insurance, banking, and securities.”” The ERISA
savings clause exempts state laws “to the extent they are applied
to insurance companies or insurance policies, even if they might
impact on employee benefit plans”72 This, in effect, leaves open
a window for state insurance regulation. Examples include work
ers’ and unemployment compensation and disability insurance.’7’
Thus, the F{aaii State Legislature may be able to use the ERISA
savings clause to uphold the state’s prerogative to regulate certain
aspects of insurance, The courts may provide additional support.
B. Judicial Review
For many years, the specific language of the express preemption left
little room for judicial maneuvering.’ ERISA’s broad preemption
explicitly’ states that it preempts “‘any and all state laws insofar as
they . relate to any emplo cc benefit plan,” Despite Congress’s
intent that the “relates to” clause he applied broadly’, some courts
have not been so deferential,’’”
One commentator has suggested that judicial review “through a
flexible and adaptive judicial doctrine of preemption” might have
been a better method to resolve conflicts between state and federal
interests. - In Standard Oil (‘ompanv 01 Cali/iii’ma t’. ..4,gsaliul. in
which Standard Oil first challenged the PPHCA alleging it had been
preempted hs ERISA, Judge Renfress of the United States District
Court, Northern District of California, held that ERISA did in fact
preempt the PPHCA, However, he very importantly noted that:
lhlv enacting ERISA, Congress created a moratorium of indefinite
length at the passage of health insurance lass s. Congress could ratio
nally has e decided to take a different course, It troubles the Court. as
it troubles defendants, that Congress preempted state health insurance
lass s apparently ss ithout specific discussion of the need forsuch a step.
The workers whom ERISA ss as primarily intended to protect may he
better off with state health insurance lass s than without them, and the
efforts of states like Hawaii to ensure that their citizens have low-cost
comprehensive health insurance may he significantly impaired by
ERISA’s preemption of health insurance lasss.
Judge Renfrew urged Congress to consider the advice of Justice
Brandeis:
Federal legislators should heed the admonition that Justice Brandeis
addressed to the federal courts: “To stay experimentation in things
social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to
experiment may he fraught ss ith serious consequences to the Nation,
It is one of the happ incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may’, if its citizens choose. serve as a laboratory:
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country’.”’91’
One commentator has opined that the savings clause is unambigu
otis and should be accepted for its plain meaning. “ERlSAexpresslv
states that it does not preempt stale laws that regulate insurance:
‘[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve
any person from any law of any state which regulates insurance.
‘“‘9’
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that healthcare and
insurance regulation have historically been state domain and “that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”c ERISA’s preemption clause was intended to protect
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pension plans and retirement benefits, not to preempt state sovereignty
in health and insurance., and to apply a broader interpretation to the
preeniption clause would require clear Congressional intent. The
Court today appears to be contracting ERISA’s broad preemption
clause.
Further guidance in this area of ERISA preemption of state laws
is found in Kentucky Asstz. Of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller. In this
2003 case, the Court held
Toda we make a clean break from the MeCarran—Ferguson Fietors
and hold that for a state law to he deemed a la ‘. v hich regulates
insurance under I l44(by2 tA), ii must satisfy two requirements.
First, the state law must he specifically directed toward entities en
gaged in insurance. Second. as explained above, the state law must
suhstantialt affect the risk pooline arrangement hets ecu the insurer
and the insured.’ -
Perhaps the Court’s new direction relating to the savings clause will
provide an alternative to an otherwise inflexible PPHCA.
C. Federal Intervention
One federal approach would be a Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
investigation.04The advantages ofa DOJ analysis include expertise
in antitrust evaluations, the resources needed to perform economet
ric studies, and the general belief that an outside agency will look
objectively at a situation in which the State itself may have been
negligent by not providing adequate oversight and supervision of the
PPHCC.’55 Several procedures are available for enforcing antitrust
law: criminal punishment,85equitable relief including proceedings
in equity,°7 private suits in equity.55 consent decrees,09 and also
private actions.
However, a Congressional amendment which would allow Hawaii
to change its PPHCA would most directly remove the restrictions
under which Hawaii’s current health care system must operate.
The 1983 exemption that holds the PPHCA to its 1974 languag&
prevents any contemporary response to meeting increasing health
care costs and changing demographics Many feel that ERISA in
general has had a disastrous effect on state efforts to improve access
to health care. ‘‘°—‘ They hold little hope that any state’s attempt to
obtain corrective action from Congr
ess can he successful, especially
in view of Hawaii’s protracted attempt from 1974 to 1983 to obtain
its exemption.03 Congress’s original intent with ERISA was to
establish a uniform nation—wide standard for employee rights and
employer responsibilities in order to stabilize pension plans and
protect retirees,04 Because of this original aim toward national
uniformity, ERISA stifles state innovation and modem response to
current health care needs.
Consideration should also be given to actually repealing the
PPHCA. This is probably the best way to open the doors to coin-
petition. Although proponents will argue that Hawaii employees
will lose health care benefits, this author believes it more likely
that employers would continue to provide insurance to employees
just as they did from l974_l983,0 while the PPHCA was actually
preempted by ERISA. Even in the absence of a mandate, it is highl
likely that providing medical benelits will remain an important way
in which small business employers can compete for more qualified
employees*”
V. Conclusion
In 1974, two laudable events occurred: Hawaii passed the PPHCA,
designed to ensure that more of its citizens have access to reason
able health care coverage at a reasonable price:”7 and Congress
passed ERISA. designed to assure American citizens that pension
and other employee benefit plans would be well-managed and kept
solvent.08 Congress attached a very broad preemption clause to
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ERISA in order to insure that all Americans would he covered and
that ERISA plans would be portable. ‘ This clause, however, had
the unfortunate effect of preempting the Hawaii PPHCA.’
Later. Congress granted Hawaii a unique exemption from ERISA
preemption and provided an opportunity for Hawaii’s statewide ex
periment in employer mandated health care coverage.2’However.
Congress’s grant of this ERISA exemption also tied Hawaii to the
law (PPI-ICA as it was enacted in I 974. Now, almost three de
cades later. f-Iawan’s PPHCA has become outmoded and untenable.
Further. the PPI-IC,\ likely tailed its uricinal purpose of increasing
health care access. Thc number of insureds in 1969. 88.1 ° is
not appreciably different from that in 1999, three decades later, at
$$9%244 Although Hawaii’s marketplace and demographics have
changed dramatically204,Hawaii remains tied to the 1974 PPHCA
language and therefore is unable to address modern demands.
The constraints of Hawans express exemption deny Hawaii any
flexibility in meeting the new demands of a changed niarket.
These demands are exemplified by the conflict het een balancing
increased patient expectations and higher longevity v ith decreased
resources and higher costs of providing that care. Additionally, the
language of the Act itself calls for new plans to meet a standard of
benefits set by the largest plans in the state. This type of regulation
has set an artificially achieved benchmark and is not a benchmark
achieved as a result of a freely competitive market.
Further, the PPHCA v as implemented in such a way that it raised
questions of conflict of interest and monopoly maintenance. The
Dl,IR Director’s responsibility is to administer the Act1 after
receiving recommendations and advice from the Council.1 The
Director determines whether any applicant plan meets mandated
.Seo snpIanniex 2. 48-48, and xcccoosnyin8 text.
s1Jp1 4 .,,
a
208. See san’a notes. 33-38, and accsn. an ySg text.
2051. See siipra notes 1.04-tOo, 127-138, •and accompanying text,
210, See sxipra notes 104-108, and acnsrn noosing text.
21.1. Seesupnsten 11.12, tOO, and accn.moanying text.
211. See sxora note.x 03-173, and acco xn4ng text.
requirements.1 Flowever. in the past. health plans applying to do
business in the state found a formidable hurdle in both the application
process and in meeting the benchmark asset by the PPF-ICA and a’
implemented by the Counc1l.t Formerly. applicant plans were at a
distinct disadvantage, having to share proprietary information with
marketplace competitors2 who were members of the committee.2
This created a glaring conflict of interest, at sorst, illegal monopoly
maintenance, and at best, an appearance of impropriety.
As H\ISA and Kaiser has e recemln resigned their memberships
on the Council. the Governor’s ness l appointed DLIR Director has
a fresh opportunito to rev ie the composition and functions of the
Council and to pro\’ide safeguards to protect proprietary in lormation.
The State must insure active supervision of the Council’s activities
in order to encourage the entry of new competitors to the Hawaii
market.
The State may also consider implementing initiatives, on a local
level, of I ) laws of general applicahilito and 2) lass s that relate to
insurance regulation. Both of these approache.s mao’ gi e I lawaii
options to deal with rising health care costs, and would not be at
odds with ERISA. Indeed, the language that authorizes these ap
proaches is found ‘a ithin ERISA itself.211
Additionally, the State may ask its’ Congressional delegation to
pursue a broader ERISA exemption, one that will allow Hawaii to
change its PPHCA. encouraging competition and promoting inno
vation in its health care delivery system. Undoubtedly, it will take
courage. tenacity, and resources to honestly’ evaluate the effects
of the PPHCA. to pursue the modifications necessary to make it
relevant for today’s world, and. alternatively, to work for its repeal
if other solutions prove untenable.
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